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In	 2019,	 the	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 decided	 Lamps	 Plus,	 Inc.	 v.	




















































feiting	 their	 ability	 to	 represent	 a	 class.15	 Likewise,	 critics	 called	
Lamps	Plus	a	“revolution”	in	the	Court’s	FAA	jurisprudence.16	They	ar-











	 13.	 Id.	 at	 1421	 (Ginsburg,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (quoting	 Judith	 Resnik,	 Revising	 Our	




tration	 agreement	 should	not	be	 expected	 to	 realize	 that	 she	 is	 giving	up	access	 to	
[class	actions].”).	 Justice	Breyer	joined	Justices	Ginsburg’s	and	Kagan’s	dissents,	and	
also	wrote	separately	 to	opine	 that	 the	Ninth	Circuit	 lacked	 jurisdiction	 to	hear	 the	
appeal.	See	id.	at	1422–27	(Breyer,	J.,	dissenting)	(“Consequently,	I	would	hold	that	we	
lack	jurisdiction	over	this	case.”).	












judge	nor	announced	 in	Congress.	 Instead,	 it	was	made	 in	an	office	
building	in	Garden	City,	New	York18	An	entity	called	National	Arbitra-
tion	and	Mediation	(NAM),	which	administers	arbitrations,	adopted	












tration	 Is—Almost—Dead,	 JD	 SUPRA	 (July	 22,	 2019),	 https://www.jdsupra.com/	
legalnews/class-arbitration-is-almost-dead-60871	[https://perma.cc/6GJ5-CDGQ]	
(explaining	 how	Lamps	 Plus	 decision	 “refused	 to	 address	whether	 class	 arbitration	
constitutes	a	‘question	of	arbitrability’	presumptively	for	courts,	rather	than	arbitra-
tors,	 to	decide”);	Bloomberg,	Supreme	Court	Gives	Businesses	More	Power	to	Require	




-story.html]	 (explaining	 that	 Lamps	 Plus	 “help[s]	 companies	 avoid	 the	 prospect	 of	
costly	class	actions	filed	by	workers	and	consumers”);	Adam	Liptak,	Split	5	to	4,	Su-
preme	Court	Deals	 a	Blow	 to	 Class	 Arbitrations,	 N.Y.	TIMES	 (Apr.	 24,	 2019),	 https://	
www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/supreme-court-class-arbitrations.html	
[https://perma.cc/KU55-LPWG]	(noting	 that	decisions	 like	Lamps	Plus	“can	make	 it	
difficult	for	consumers	and	workers	to	pursue	minor	claims	even	where	their	collec-
tive	harm	was	substantial”).	
	 18.	 Conference	 Facilities	 Nationwide,	 NAT’L	 ARB.	 &	 MEDIATION,	 https://www	
.namadr.com/about/locations	[https://perma.cc/2DEY-PX43]	(explaining	location	of	
National	Arbitration	and	Mediation’s	headquarters).	
	 19.	 NAT’L	ARB.	&	MEDIATION,	 EMPLOYMENT	RULES	 AND	 PROCEDURES	 r.12.f.iii,	 at	 8	













tration	 [in]	 .	.	.	 the	 American	Arbitration	Association	 [(AAA)]	 in	 ac-
cordance	with	the	Commercial	Arbitration	Rules.”22		
























(2016)	 [hereinafter	 AAA	 COMMERCIAL	 RULES],	 https://www.adr.org/sites/default/	
























contractually	 bound	 to	 arbitrate,	 but	 blocked	 from	 pursuing	 their	
cases	in	that	forum.33		
*	*	*	



























	 36.	 Id.	at	986;	see	also	Arthur	R.	Miller,	Simplified	Pleading,	Meaningful	Days	 in	
Court,	and	Trials	on	the	Merits:	Reflections	on	the	Deformation	of	Federal	Procedure,	88	













have	the	benefit	of	 these	 iconic	procedural	rules.	 In	1925,	Congress	
passed	the	FAA	to	encourage	merchants	to	resolve	breach	of	contract	
disputes	privately.40	But	in	the	1980s,	the	Court	hijacked	the	statute,	
holding	 that	 it	 preempts	 state	 law,41	 governs	 federal	 statutory	
claims,42	and	embodies	a	“liberal	federal	policy	favoring	arbitration.”43	
Forced	 arbitration	 clauses	 became	 “a	 phenomenon	 that	 pervade[s]	















	 42.	 Mitsubishi	Motors	Corp.	v.	Soler	Chrysler-Plymouth,	 Inc.,	473	U.S.	614,	626	
(1985)	(ordering	arbitration	of	complex	Sherman	Act	allegations).	
	 43.	 Moses	H.	Cone	Mem’l	Hosp.	v.	Mercury	Constr.	Corp.,	460	U.S.	1,	24	(1983).	














	 51.	 See	 About	 Us,	 JAMS,	 https://www.jamsadr.com/about	 [https://perma.cc/	
RWA8-4B3B].	










The	 contracts	 of	 Fortune	 500	 companies	 like	 Amazon,55	 AT&T,56	
 
	 53.	 See	 Arbitration,	 U.S.	 ARB.	 &	 MEDIATION,	 https://usam.com/arbitration	
[https://perma.cc/89EB-7UPR].	
	 54.	 See,	e.g.,	AAA	COMMERCIAL	RULES,	supra	note	23;	ADR	SERVS.,	INC.,	ARBITRATION	
RULES	 (2017)	 [hereinafter	 ADR	 SERVICES	 RULES],	 https://www.adrservices.com/wp	
-content/uploads/2017/04/ADR-ARBITRATION-RULES-Final-Version-4-11-17.pdf	
[https://perma.cc/9UNJ-5MY9];	ALT.	RESOL.	CTRS.,	ARBITRATION	RULES	(2011)	[herein-





BUSINESS	 DISPUTES	 (2019),	 https://www.adrforum.com/assets/resources/Arbitra-
tion/Rules/Forum.B2B_Rules.v2.3.pdf	[https://perma.cc/BN4M-WXZE];	JAMS,	
COMPREHENSIVE	 ARBITRATION	 RULES	 &	 PROCEDURES	 (2014)	 [hereinafter	 JAMS	
COMPREHENSIVE	 RULES],	 https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration	
[https://perma.cc/ZTQ4-XMTR];	Commercial	Arbitration	Rules,	JUDICATE	W.	[hereinaf-
ter	 JW	 Commercial	 Rules],	 https://www.judicatewest.com/Resources/Arbitration	
Rules	 [https://perma.cc/YC5W-ZLU3];	 U.S.	 ARB.	 &	 MEDIATION,	 CONSOLIDATED	
ARBITRATION	 RULES	 (2019)	 [hereinafter	 USA&M	 RULES],	 https://usam.com/wp	
-content/uploads/2019/03/consolidated-arbitration-rules-3.28.19.pdf	[https://	
perma.cc/FW7U-A8YS].	





















	 57.	 See	 Terms	 of	 Use,	 CVS	PHARMACY	 (March	 21,	 2019),	 https://www.cvs.com/	
help/terms_of_use.jsp	 [https://perma.cc/EMA2-XYCW]	 (referring	 to	AAA	Consumer	
Arbitration	Rules).	
	 58.	 See	Exxon	Mobil	Rewards+	Program	Terms	and	Conditions,	EXXON	MOBIL	(July	
11,	 2018),	 https://www.exxon.com/en/exxon-mobil-rewards-plus-terms	 [https://	
perma.cc/7MRR-QPKK]	(referring	to	AAA	Consumer	Arbitration	Rules).	
	 59.	 See	User	Terms,	ONSTAR	(May	1,	2018),	https://www.onstar.com/us/en/user_	
terms	 [https://perma.cc/RRK5-7RVC]	 (referring	 to	 AAA	 Commercial	 Arbitration	
Rules).	
	 60.	 See	 FedEx	 Tech	 Manager	 Terms	 and	 Conditions,	 FEDEX,	 http://www.fedex	
.com/techmanager/terms	[https://perma.cc/HZD8-TLCF]	(referring	to	AAA	Commer-
cial	Rules).	







	 63.	 See	 Terms	 of	 Use,	 WALGREENS	 BOOTS	 ALL.,	 https://www.walgreensboots	
alliance.com/terms-use	 [https://perma.cc/E9GC-7F6X]	 (referring	 to	 AAA’s	 Supple-
mentary	Procedures	for	Consumer-Related	Disputes).	
	 64.	 See	 Walmart.com	 Terms	 of	 Use,	 WALMART,	 https://help.walmart.com/app/	
answers/detail/a_id/8#19	 [https://perma.cc/T2KT-2QZR]	 (referring	 to	 JAMS	 Arbi-
tration	Streamlined	Rules	&	Procedures).	
	 65.	 See	 Comcast	 Agreement	 for	 Residential	 Services,	 XFINITY,	 https://www	
.xfinity.com/corporate/customers/policies/subscriberagreement	 [https://perma.cc/	
78SJ-4LMC]	(referring	to	AAA	Consumer	Arbitration	Rules).	
	 66.	 See	 WELLS	 FARGO,	 DEPOSIT	 ACCOUNT	 AGREEMENT	 4	 (2019),	 https://www	
.wellsfargo.com/fetch-pdf?formNumber=CCB2018C&subProductCode=ANY	 [https://	
perma.cc/6W8T-7YCV]	(referring	to	AAA	Consumer	Arbitration	Rules).	















fer	 “organized”	 arbitration,	which	was	more	 structured	 than	 tradi-



















cons	of	 “[c]ontracts	modifying	 the	spectrum	of	procedure,	 from	commonplace	 jury-
trial	waivers	 to	 sophisticated	 alterations	 of	 evidentiary	 obligations	 and	 burdens	 of	
proof”);	Jessica	Erickson,	Bespoke	Discovery,	71	VAND.	L.	REV.	1873,	1876	(2018)	(fo-
cusing	on	“ex	ante	agreements	between	two	or	more	parties	regarding	how	they	will	
collect	 and	exchange	 information	 in	any	 future	disputes	between	 them”).	However,	
these	 commentators	 have	 largely	 ignored	 the	 discrete	 phenomenon	 of	 procedural	
rulemaking	by	arbitration	providers.	
	 70.	 A	 few	 articles	 have	 analyzed	particular	 providers’	 rules,	 but	 they	 are	 both	
much	more	narrowly	focused	than	this	Article	and	decades	out	of	date.	See	generally	J.	




















visions	 into	 millions	 of	 contracts,	 projecting	 the	 Arbitration	 Rules	
across	vast	swaths	of	the	civil	justice	landscape.		














Of	 course,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Arbitration	 Rules	 deviate	 from	 the	
Federal	Rules	is	not	inherently	troubling.	After	all,	the	point	of	alter-











However,	 procedural	 rulemaking	 by	 arbitration	 providers	 also	
has	a	dark	side.	For	one,	allowing	profit-seeking	providers	to	create	
their	 own	 procedural	 fiefdoms	 has	 predictable	 consequences.	 Over	




























































serve	 as	 true	 substitutes	 for	 the	 court	 system	because	 their	 proce-
dures	 cover	 “all	 kinds	of	 disputes”83	 and	 “transcend[]	 .	.	.	 any	 given	
professional	or	trade	association.”84	In	addition,	the	Article	does	not	
dwell	on	how	private	procedural	rulemaking	affects	business-to-busi-





advent	 of	 forced	 arbitration	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 providers	
brought	untold	numbers	of	disputes	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Arbi-



































was	 a	 sprawling	 mess.	 Federal	 practice	 was	 bifurcated.	 In	 equity,	
courts	applied	the	Federal	Equity	Rules.87	But	when	a	matter	was	at	
law,	 the	Conformity	Act	of	1872	 instructed	 the	 judge	 to	 follow	“the	
practice,	pleadings,	and	forms	and	modes	of	proceeding”	of	the	state	
in	which	it	sat.88	In	turn,	because	the	Conformity	Act	was	riddled	with	
exceptions,	 “one	 did	 not	 know	 what	 procedural	 law	 would	 apply:	
state,	federal,	or	judge-made.”89	Under	this	convoluted	regime,	“a	law-
yer	practicing	in	the	[f]ederal	courts,	even	in	his	own	state,	fe[lt]	no	






































As	 is	well-known,	 the	Federal	Rules,	which	became	effective	 in	





triumph	 of	 minimalism.	 The	 Federal	 Rules	 abolished	 single	 issue	
pleading,	authorized	expansive	discovery,	and	permitted	easy	joinder	
of	parties.97	Finally,	 the	Federal	Rules	went	out	of	their	way	to	give	




had	 taken	 a	 step	 toward	 addressing	 the	widespread	dissatisfaction	
with	 the	 judicial	 system	 by	 passing	 the	 Federal	 Arbitration	 Act	

































judges	 refused	 to	 uphold	 pre-dispute	 contracts	 to	 arbitrate.102	 The	
FAA	 abolished	 these	 anti-arbitration	 rules	 through	 its	 centerpiece,	
section	 2,	which	makes	 arbitration	 clauses	 specifically	 enforceable,	
















tors	 and	 le[ft]	 them	 to	 blunder	 along	 .	.	.	 without	 procedural	
guidance.”108	 To	 be	 sure,	 some	 trade	 associations	 and	 merchant	
groups	created	charters	and	bylaws	to	govern	their	conflict	resolution	
regimes.109	 Nevertheless,	 these	 were	 mere	 sketches	 of	 procedural	
rules.	For	example,	the	New	York	Chamber	of	Commerce’s	arbitration	
 






































resolution	machinery	 to	 try	 to	 insulate	arbitration	 from	 judicial	 re-
view.	As	Frances	Kellor,	a	founder	and	vice	president	of	the	AAA,	ob-
served,	 “[t]he	 old	 practice	 of	 avoiding	 rules	 of	 procedure	 [had]	 re-
sult[ed]	in	loopholes	through	which	the	courts	could	upset	awards.”119	
Thus,	by	promulgating	Arbitration	Rules,	the	AAA	“avoid[ed]	duplica-
tion,	 conflict,	or	confusion	as	 to	what	each	participant	should	do	 in	
processing	a	case”	and	maximized	the	odds	that	“both	the	arbitration	
agreement	and	the	award”	would	be	“found	to	be	legally	valid	and	en-
forceable.”120	 This	 strategy	 proved	 successful.	 In	 1931,	 the	
 
	 110.	 RULES	 AND	REGULATIONS	 OF	 THE	CHAMBER	 OF	COMMERCE	 OF	 THE	STATE	 OF	NEW	






































controversy”	 and	 is	 “adaptable	 to	 any	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	 United	









































aspiration	 and	 adopted	 specialized	 principles	 for	 commercial,	 tort,	
and	labor	disputes.129	Although	the	differences	between	these	Rules	






































putes	 between	 big	 businesses,	 and	 thus	 featured	 three-arbitrator	
panels,	evidentiary	privileges,	and	reasoned	awards.136	A	year	 later,	

























































of	 claim”	 nor	 “promot[e]	 procedures	 incompatible	 with	 arbitra-
tion.”147	Banks,	credit	card	issuers,	employers,	hospitals,	and	schools	
added	arbitration	clauses	to	their	fine	print.148		


















(Ct.	 App.	 2019)	 (internal	 quotations	marks	 omitted)	 (citing	AT&T	Mobility	 L.L.C.	 v.	






















maker.156	 Providers	 displayed	 little	 interest	 in	 these	 recommenda-
tions.157	But	then	the	powerful	National	Employment	Lawyers	Associ-
ation	threatened	to	boycott	the	AAA	and	JAMS.158	As	an	olive	branch,	
both	 institutions	adopted	 the	Task	Force’s	proposals	 in	 the	 form	of	
“Due	Process	Protocol”	(in	the	AAA)159	and	“Minimum	Standards”	(in	
 














	 156.	 AM.	ARB.	ASS’N,	 EMPLOYMENT	DUE	PROCESS	PROTOCOL	 1	 (1995),	 https://www	
.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Employment%20Due%	
20Process%20Protocol_0.pdf	[https://perma.cc/GCZ4-8FJ5]	(offering	suggestions	for	
forced	 employment	 arbitration);	 JOHN	T.	DUNLOP	&	ARNOLD	M.	ZACK,	MEDIATION	 AND	
ARBITRATION	OF	EMPLOYMENT	DISPUTES	149–67	(1997)	(providing	 further	suggestions	
for	forced	employment	arbitration).	




	 159.	 AM.	ARB.	ASS’N,	CONSUMER	DUE	PROCESS	PROTOCOL	STATEMENT	OF	PRINCIPLES	 1	
(1998),	 https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer%	
20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf	[https://perma.cc/RY3Z-3Z8X];	AM.	ARB.	







ciples	 into	 special	 Arbitration	 Rules.162	 Among	 other	 things,	 these	
progressive	 procedural	 codes	 open	 the	 courthouse	 door—or,	more	
accurately,	 the	 conference	 room	 door—by	 requiring	 businesses	 to	
subsidize	plaintiffs’	claims.	In	consumer	cases,	the	AAA’s	filing	and	ad-
ministrative	costs	range	up	to	$2,200,	but	individuals	only	pay	$200	
of	 this	 sum.163	 Likewise,	 although	 JAMS’	 Comprehensive	Rules	 pre-
scribe	 a	 $1,750	 filing	 fee	 in	 two-party	 matters,164	 its	 Employment	















Protocol.”).	 In	 addition,	 the	 AAA’s	 efforts	 to	 create	 a	 Due	 Process	 Protocol	 for	
healthcare	arbitrations	led	to	the	institution	refusing	to	handle	such	cases	when	they	
stem	 from	 a	 pre-dispute	 arbitration	 clause.	 AM.	ARB.	ASS’N,	 AAA	HEALTHCARE	POLICY	
STATEMENT	 (2003),	 https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/	





	 162.	 See	 AM.	 ARB.	 ASS’N,	 CONSUMER	ARBITRATION	 RULES	 (2014)	 [hereinafter	 AAA	
CONSUMER	 RULES],	 https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf	
[https://perma.cc/6XV8-QAW8];	AM.	ARB.	ASS’N,	EMPLOYMENT	ARBITRATION	RULES	AND	
MEDIATION	 PROCEDURES	 (2007)	 [hereinafter	 AAA	 EMPLOYMENT	 RULES],	 https://www	
.adr.org/sites/default/files/employment_arbitration_rules_and_mediation_	
procedures_0.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/3WX9-HL9C];	 Streamlined	 Arbitration	 Rules	 &	
Procedures,	JAMS	(2014)	[hereinafter	JAMS	Streamlined	Rules],	https://www.jamsadr	
.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration	 [https://perma.cc/WG2M-84UE];	 Employment	

























old	 questions	 about	 whether	 arbitration	 should	 proceed,	 such	 as	
whether	an	arbitration	clause	is	valid	or	broad	enough	to	cover	a	par-
ticular	 cause	 of	 action.170	 Yet	 in	 First	 Options	 v.	 Kaplan,	 the	 Court	
opined	that	parties	can	reverse	this	default	rule	and	assign	arbitrabil-
ity	to	the	arbitrator	if	“there	is	‘clea[r]	and	unmistakabl[e]’	evidence”	
that	 they	 intended	 to	do	 so.171	To	eliminate	 judicial	 review	of	 their	
contracts,	firms	began	to	give	arbitrators	the	“exclusive	authority	to	
resolve	 any	 dispute	 relating	 to	 the	 interpretation,	 applicability,	 en-
forceability	 or	 formation	 of	 this	 [arbitration	 clause].”172	 In	 a	 2010	
 
	 165.	 JAMS	EMPLOYMENT	RULES,	supra	note	162,	at	r.	31(c).	
	 166.	 Employment	Dispute	Arbitration	Procedure,		INT’L	 INST.	 FOR	 CONFLICT	
PREVENTION	 &	 RESOL.	 (2020),	 https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/rules/	
arbitration/employment-arbitration-procedure	[https://perma.cc/4AQP-LLZG];	
NAT’L	 ARB.	 &	 MEDIATION,	 NAM’S	 MINIMUM	 STANDARDS	 OF	 PROCEDURAL	 FAIRNESS	 FOR	






















Second,	 the	 Court	 encouraged	 companies	 to	 use	 arbitration	
clauses	 to	deter	 class	actions.	About	 two	decades	ago,	 corporations	
began	experimenting	with	class	arbitration	waivers,	which	mandate	
that	plaintiffs	arbitrate	on	an	individual	basis.174	Yet	a	chorus	of	courts	
held	 that	 these	 provisions	 were	 unconscionable	 when	 applied	 to	
plaintiffs	who	alleged	 that	a	business	had	deprived	 them	of	a	small	
amount	 of	 money.175	 These	 judges	 reasoned	 that	 because	 no	 con-
sumer	or	employee	would	incur	the	time,	energy,	and	money	to	pur-
sue	low-dollar	complaints,	class	arbitration	waivers	function	as	excul-
patory	 clauses.176	 Nevertheless,	 in	 2011’s	 AT&T	 Mobility	 LLC	 v.	
Concepcion,	the	Justices	held	that	the	FAA	forbids	courts	from	finding	
class	arbitration	waivers	to	be	unconscionable.177	The	Court	opined	





















































ulgating	 the	Federal	Rules—court	 rulemaking—invites	public	 input	
and	is	subject	to	congressional	oversight.186	As	this	section	explains,	
 




STUDY	 FINDS	 THAT	 ARBITRATION	 AGREEMENTS	 LIMIT	 RELIEF	 FOR	 CONSUMERS	 (2015),	
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_arbitration-study.pdf	
[https://perma.cc/7J8P-XYM8];	Alexander	J.S.	Colvin,	The	Growing	Use	of	Mandatory	














rulemaking.187	 Rather	 than	drafting	 procedures	 itself,	 Congress	 has	
delegated	 the	 task	 to	 the	 Supreme	Court	 under	 the	Rules	 Enabling	












































and	 longer	 periods	 for	 public	 commentary.”195	 For	 example,	 before	
the	 Advisory	 Committee	 amended	 the	 discovery	 rules	 in	 2015,	 it	
heard	testimony	from	120	witnesses	and	received	2,300	written	com-

























	 196.	 John	J.	 Jablonski	&	Alexander	R.	Dahl,	The	2015	Amendments	 to	 the	Federal	
Rules	of	Civil	Procedure:	Guide	to	Proportionality	in	Discovery	and	Implementing	a	Safe	
Harbor	for	Preservation,	82	DEF.	COUNS.	J.	411,	412	(2015).	




	 200.	 See	 Rules,	 Forms,	 Fees,	 AM.	 ARB.	 ASS’N,	 https://www.adr.org/ArchiveRules	
[https://perma.cc/E573-RVXK];	 Arbitration	 Rules,	 ADR	 SERVS.,	 INC.,	 https://www.	
adrservices.com/services/arbitration-rules	[https://perma.cc/DAD9-2QXG].	
	 201.	 See	 Summary	 of	 Revisions	 to	 Employment	 Arbitration	 Rules,	 JAMS,	 http://	
jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/2014-Summary-of	
-Employment-Rules-Changes.pdf	[https://perma.cc/BE7S-GB5M].	
	 202.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Rules,	 Fees	 and	 Forms,	 NAT’L	 ARB.	 &	 MEDIATION,	 https://www	
.namadr.com/resources/rules-fees-forms	 [https://perma.cc/D95G-KC84];	 JW	 Com-












will	 be	most	 alarming	 to	 those	who	 subscribe	 to	 the	 “[g]overnance	




ments	 that	 were	 created	 by	 elected	 representatives.	 For	 example,	









































and-comment	 period	 and	 the	 specter	 of	 congressional	 disapproval.	







are	 incorporated	 through	 fleeting	 reference	 to	 the	 “ADR	 Services’	
[A]rbitration	[R]ules,”212	“the	Commercial	Rules	of	the	American	Ar-




























































	 221.	 Id.;	 see	also	Shankle	v.	B-G	Maint.	Mgmt.	of	Colo.,	 Inc.,	163	F.3d	1230,	1235	
(10th	Cir.	1999)	(“We	reject	a	presumption	that	arbitrators	will	be	unable	to	perform	
in	a	competent	and	impartial	manner	if	one	party	pays	the	bill.”).	Today,	most	provid-
ers	 embrace	 this	 “employer	 pays”	 policy	 for	 forced	 arbitrations.	 See	 Employment/	








state	supervision	proved	 to	be	 important	 in	1996,	when	 the	NASD	proposed	a	new	
Arbitration	Rule	 that	 limited	 its	 customers’	 ability	 to	win	punitive	damages	against	
brokerages.	See	id.	The	SEC	was	inundated	with	complaints	and	torpedoed	the	Rule.	












The	 evidence	 is	mixed.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 some	providers	 have	
bowed	to	the	wishes	of	their	primary	clientele.	The	most	infamous	ex-
ample	is	the	National	Arbitration	Forum	(NAF).	The	NAF	was	once	the	


















users	 were	 .	.	.	 furious”	 and	 “made	 clear	 that	 there	 were	 other	
 
	 223.	 See	Press	 Release,	Minn.	 Off.	 of	 the	 Att’y	 Gen.,	 National	 Arbitration	 Forum	
Barred	from	Credit	Card	and	Consumer	Arbitrations	Under	Agreement	with	Attorney	
General	 Swanson	 (July	 19,	 2009)	 [hereinafter	 NAF	 Press	 Release],	 https://pubcit	
.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf	[https://perma.cc/G6JT-38CE].	












































































Domain	 Name	 Disputes,241	 Election	 Arbitration	 Rules,242	 Employee	

















	 241.	 AM.	 ARB.	 ASS’N,	 AAA	 DOMAIN	 NAME	 DISPUTES	 SUPPLEMENTARY	 RULES	 (2011),	
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/AAA_Domain_Name_Disputes_	
Supplementary_Rules_0.pdf	[https://perma.cc/KN8F-JWFF].	
	 242.	 AM.	 ARB.	 ASS’N,	 ELECTION	 ARBITRATION	 RULES	 OF	 THE	 AMERICAN	 ARBITRATION	
ASSOCIATION	(2014),	https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Election%	
20Arbitration%20Rules.pdf	[https://perma.cc/7B97-LTTM].	










dures,248	 Employment	 Arbitration	 Rules	 &	 Procedures,249	 and	
International	 Arbitration	 Rules.250	 Finally,	 the	 Forum	 classifies	 dis-
putes	as	either	Business-to-Business,251	Employment,252	Franchise,253	
or	Intellectual	Property.254	NAM	uses	Standard	Rules,255	Comprehen-
sive	 Rules,256	 Employment	 Rules257	 and	 Realtor/Homeowner	
Rules,258	and	USA&M	has	issued	addendums	to	its	code	for	consumer	
 
	 244.	 AM.	 ARB.	 ASS’N,	 HOME	 CONSTRUCTION	 ARBITRATION	 RULES	 AND	 MEDIATION	
PROCEDURES	 (2018),	 https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Home_Construction_	
Arbitration_Rules_and_Mediation_Procedures.pdf	[https://perma.cc/25E5-PSS9].	








	 250.	 JAMS	 International	 Arbitration	 Rules	 &	 Procedures,	 JAMS	 (Sept.	 1,	 2016),	
https://www.jamsadr.com/international-arbitration-rules/English	[https://perma	
.cc/KS9M-CRM4].	













inafter	 NAM	 STANDARD	 RULES],	 https://www.namadr.com/content/uploads/2020/	
04/RULES-STANDARD.pdf	[https://perma.cc/F2RJ-YEH3].	
	 256.	 NAT’L	ARB.	&	MEDIATION,	NAM	COMPREHENSIVE	DISPUTE	RESOLUTION	RULES	AND	














NAM	 guarantees	 each	 side	 three	 depositions,262	 JAMS	 and	 JW	offer	
one,263	and	the	AAA	blandly	declares	that	the	arbitrator	“shall	have	the	
authority	to	order	such	discovery	.	.	.	as	[he	or	she]	considers	neces-




gress	 in	 lockstep	under	 the	Federal	Rules,	but	march	 to	 the	beat	of	
each	provider	under	the	Arbitration	Rules.		
Third,	because	most	Arbitration	Rules	are	mere	defaults,	drafters	
can	modify	 them.	 Indeed,	private	dispute	resolution	 “allows	parties	
the	contractual	 freedom	to	 tailor	 their	procedural	 rules	as	 they	see	
fit.”267	As	a	result,	firms	often	customize	the	statute	of	limitations,268	
the	aegis	of	discovery,269	and	the	ability	to	recover	attorneys’	fees.270	
















































ified	 in	 these	rules.”	ADR	SERVICES	RULES,	supra	note	54,	at	r.	1–2;	 JAMS	Streamlined	
Rules,	supra	note	162,	at	r.	2(a)	(“The	Parties	may	agree	on	any	procedures	not	speci-






	 272.	 There	 is	 one	 exception	 to	 party	 variation:	 Rule	 1	 of	 the	 AAA	 Employment	
























plex	 antitrust	 action,	 a	 simple	 automobile	 negligence	 case,	 a	 hard-fought	





cases	and	assign[]	 them	 to	different	processing	 tracks	either	by	di-
mension,	complexity,	or	substance.”275		
And	that	is	what	the	Arbitration	Rules	do.	For	example,	the	gen-


























































are	simple.	 Indeed,	when	there	 is	a	single	code,	pro	se	 litigants	can	
easily	find	the	relevant	principles,	and	“lawyers	do	not	need	to	relearn	
procedure	every	time	they	delve	into	a	new	field	of	substantive	doc-
trine.”284	 By	 contrast,	 the	 dizzying	 heterogeneity	 of	 the	 Arbitration	
Rules	is	not	user-friendly.	Even	an	issue	as	fundamental	as	the	admis-
sion	of	evidence285	varies	widely	between	discrete	sets	of	Arbitration	




































on	 procedural	 rule-makers.	 Because	members	 of	 the	 Federal	 Rules	
Committees	 are	 not	 elected,	 their	 handiwork	must	 be	 apolitical.292	























	 290.	 See	Chandrasekher	&	Horton,	 supra	note	 231,	 at	 58	 (reporting	 that	 “high-














ment	 Rules	 offer	 at	 least	 three	 depositions,	 twenty	 interrogatories,	





























	 297.	 To	be	 fair,	Arbitration	Rules	 that	 treat	employment	claims	differently	 from	
other	claims	can	often	be	traced	back	to	judicial	rulings	that	require	additional	protec-
tions	for	employee	plaintiffs.	See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	217–32.	
	 298.	 See,	 e.g.,	 SUBCOMM.	 ON	 LONG	RANGE	PLAN.,	A	 SELF-STUDY	 OF	 FEDERAL	 JUDICIAL	














they	 generally	 “do	 not	 [permit]	 comprehensive	 discovery,”	 which	
“would	be	contrary	to	[the]	goal	of	efficient	and	economical	resolu-
tions.”303	 Similarly,	 federal	 judges	 can	 take	 as	 long	 as	 they	want	 to	
write	opinions304	and	must	explain	their	logic.305	By	contrast,	arbitra-
tors	often	need	to	rule	within	thirty	days	of	the	hearing306	and	do	not	








	 304.	 See	 Benjamin	 Weiser,	 Judge’s	 Decisions	 Are	 Conspicuously	 Late,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	
(Dec.	 6,	 2004),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/nyregion/judges-decisions	





























































































Arbitration	 Rules	 allow	 arbitrators	 to	 decide	 the	 very	 question	 of	
whether	a	case	should	be	arbitrated.317	
 








































financial	 interest	 in	 the	subject	matter	 in	controversy.”318	 Likewise,	
the	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	prohibits	deci-











characteristics	 facilitate	 inventive	and	cost-effective	dispute	 resolu-
tion.	 However,	 these	 departures	 from	 court-based	 norms	 also	 pro-
duce	toxic	byproducts:	procedures	that	either	intentionally	or	effec-


































Rent-A-Center	 opened	 the	 door	 for	 drafters	 to	 use	 delegation	
clauses	to	“clearly	and	unmistakably”	entrust	the	arbitrator	with	de-












































































Petrol.,	 LLC,	 809	F.3d	746,	 764	 (3d	Cir.	 2016)	 (holding	 that	 incorporating	 the	AAA	
Rules	does	not	delegate	clause	construction	to	the	arbitrator);	Dell	Webb	Cmtys.,	Inc.	
v.	Carlson,	817	F.3d	867,	876–77	(4th	Cir.	2016)	(same);	Reed	Elsevier,	Inc.	ex	rel.	Lex-







































delegation	 clause	when	 the	 non-drafting	 party	 is	 not	 “sophisticated”);	 Meadows	 v.	


























authority	 over	 arbitrability	 “exclusive,”	 but	 the	 AAA,	 ADR	 Services,	
CPR,	and	the	Forum	do	not	expressly	foreclose	courts	from	ruling	on	
the	 topic.330	Making	matters	worse,	because	arbitration	administra-




affect	 sophisticated	 parties,	 courts	 should	 not	 imply	 delegation	
clauses	into	adhesion	contracts.	Recall	that	Arbitration	Rules	become	
part	of	a	contract	under	the	doctrine	of	incorporation	by	reference.331	















































plicit	 but	 “clear	 and	 unmistakable”	 delegation	 clause	 should	 be	 an	
oxymoron.		
Finally,	 removing	 courts	 from	 the	 arbitrability	 calculus	 would	










To	 reiterate,	 the	 Federal	 Rules	 are	 trans-substantive	 and	 uni-
form,338	but	the	Arbitration	Rules	are	procedural	shapeshifters.339	Re-






























striking	 down	 the	 entire	 arbitration	 agreement	 and	 permitting	 the	
matter	to	proceed	in	court.	




necessarily	need	 to	subject	 independent	contractors	 to	a	provider’s	






















































crimination.349	 They	 had	 each	 signed	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 that	 ap-
plied	to	“disputes	arising	out	of	[their]	employment,”	but,	paradoxi-
cally,	selected	the	AAA’s	Commercial	Rules.350	Although	they	argued	
















that,	under	 the	AAA	Commercial	Rules,	 “arbitrators	may	award	attorneys’	 fees	only	
when	the	contract	.	.	.	includes	an	express	authorization”);	Beacon	Towers	Condo.	Tr.	v.	
Alex,	42	N.E.3d	1144,	1148	(Mass.	2016)	(holding	an	arbitrator	erred	by	awarding	at-




	 351.	 Id.	 at	 *6;	 see	 also	Tompkins	 v.	 23andMe,	 Inc.,	 No.	 13-CV-05682,	 2014	WL	
2903752,	at	*17	(N.D.	Cal.	June	25,	2014)	(rejecting	cost-based	challenge	to	arbitration	

















sofar	 as	 [it]	 require[s	 the	 plaintiff]	 to	 pay	 arbitration	 fees	 and	









chose	 the	AAA	Commercial	Rules,	 id.	 at	1153,	and	also	specified	 that	 the	prevailing	
party	could	recover	its	litigation	expenses,	see	id.	at	1150.	The	plaintiff	argued	that	the	
arbitration	 provision	was	 unconscionable	 for	 two	 reasons:	 unlike	 the	 Employment	
Rules,	the	Commercial	Rules	required	him	to	pay	hefty	fees	and	would	permit	the	de-
fendant	to	recover	attorneys’	fees	from	him	if	it	prevailed.	See	id.	at	1153–54.	The	court	















r.	 R-1	 n.*	 (2017),	 https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/CommercialRules_Web_	








Contrary	 to	 these	 opinions,	 a	 corporation’s	 use	 of	weaponized	

















Ass’n	 2	 (Nov.	 12,	 2019),	 https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/	


















	 359.	 Trompeter	 v.	 Ally	 Fin.,	 Inc.,	 914	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 1067,	 1076	 (N.D.	 Cal.	 2012);	
Booker	v.	Robert	Half	Int’l,	Inc.,	413	F.3d	77,	85	(D.C.	Cir.	2005)	(“[T]he	more	the	em-
ployer	overreaches,	the	less	likely	a	court	will	be	able	to	sever	the	provisions	and	en-










tracts;	 rather,	 companies	 strategically	 deploy	 them	 to	 deter	 claims.	






tion	 landscape.	Plaintiffs	have	 filed	 thousands	of	 individual	 cases—







to	 arbitrate	 their	 own	 low-value	 claims	 individually.365	 These	 deci-
sions	are	widely	regarded	as	one	of	the	boldest	deregulatory	strokes	















































	 372.	 See	Michael	Hiltzik,	Chipotle	May	Have	Outsmarted	 Itself	 by	Blocking	Thou-
sands	of	Employee	Lawsuits	over	Wage	Theft,	L.A.	TIMES	 (Jan.	4,	2019),	https://www	
.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-chipotle-20190104-story.html	[https://	










In,	 BLOOMBERG	L.:	DAILY	LAB.	REP.	 (Feb.	 11,	 2019),	 https://news.bloomberglaw.com/	
daily-labor-report/corporate-arbitration-tactic-backfires-as-claims-flood-in	[https://	
perma.cc/PN97-75LQ]	(reporting	that	Lyft	faces	3,420	individual	arbitrations).	





tion	 agreement	 structures.	 Before	 the	 Court	made	 class	 arbitration	waivers	 bullet-




























tion	 methodology	 they	 have	 championed—suggests	 that	 their	








of	 the	proceedings	and	prior	 to	 the	Hearing.”);	Frankel,	supra	note	368	(“Under	the	























provisions	 in	 their	 Arbitration	 Rules	 that	 allow	 them	 to	 terminate	
cases	when	a	party	defaults	on	an	 invoice.387	What	happens	next	 is	
unclear.	Some	courts	have	held	that	a	defendant	who	declines	to	par-






































	 390.	 See	 Roach,	 155	 A.3d	 at	 995	 (holding	 that	 non-payment	 of	 fees	 “bars	 the	





































Dash,	 faced	 with	 having	 to	 actually	 honor	 its	 side	 of	 the	 bargain,	 now	
blanches	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 filing	 fees	 it	 agreed	 to	 pay	 in	 the	 arbitration	
clause.	.	.	.	This	hypocrisy	will	not	be	blessed,	at	least	by	this	order.	
Id.	at	7–8.	


















an	app—and	assent	 to	 its	 terms—every	 time	 they	accept	 a	 shift.397	
Thus,	 these	 companies	 can	 amend	 their	 arbitration	 clauses	 in	 real	
time.398	 In	 fact,	 one	 day	 after	 the	 AAA	 terminated	 the	 arbitrations	


































Dash’s	 Ties	 to	New	Mass	Arbitration	Protocol	 Can	Be	Explored,	 Judge	 Says,	 LAW.COM:	


















sumptions	 of	 their	 public	 counterparts,	 such	 as	 inclusive	 drafting	
processes,	trans-substantivity,	uniformity,	and	trying	to	balance	effi-
ciency	and	accuracy.	 Some	of	 these	differences	expand	parties’	dis-
pute	resolution	options	and	 foster	procedural	 ingenuity.	But	others	
exacerbate	the	power	imbalance	that	is	inherent	in	forced	arbitration.	
By	being	sensitive	to	the	benefits	and	costs	of	the	Arbitration	Rules,	
courts	can	do	a	better	job	assimilating	private	dispute	resolution	into	
the	civil	justice	system.	
	
